STANDARDIZING THE WAGES OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN

SUMMARY

Increase of wages planned by trainmen in 1907, but not pressed because of the panic, 140.—New movement in 1909, 141.—The first attack came on the Baltimore & Ohio. Arbitration and award under the Erdman Act, 144. — Arbitration on the New York Central, and settlement on the same basis on other lines, 148. — Effects of "standardization"; inequalities remain, and are even accentuated, 151. — Connection between increase of wages and advance of freight rates; the trainmen exert pressure for higher rates, 157.

In the recent hearings on the proposed advances in freight rates, the railroads laid stress on the increases in wages of employees. Abundant evidence was introduced to show how this one item in the aggregate had increased operating expenses, but little information was offered to show the results in specific cases. The subject is of sufficient importance to justify the recital of some such detail, to trace the inception and partial success of the efforts of the employees' organizations to "standardize" rates of pay, to point out instances where standardization has defeated its object by creating new discrimination, and to note the effect which the arbitration proceedings and standardization have had and may have on the relations between the railroads and their employees.

For the purposes of this article, railroad trainmen will include conductors, train baggagemen, brakemen, flagmen, and yard switchmen. They are strongly organized, the Order of Railway Conductors con-

trolling road conductors, and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen embracing train baggagemen, brakemen, flagmen, yard conductors, and yard brakemen. The engine crews belong either to the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers or the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen. All of the brotherhoods work under the "open shop" policy and their administration, compared with that of other labor unions, has been marked by conservatism and moderation. The engineers and the firemen negotiate and maintain their working agreements separately, but the conductors and trainmen usually appoint a joint committee to represent the two orders in conferences with the management on rates of pay and working conditions.

The unit of service in the operation of trains is the train mile, and the compensation of men in train service is regulated by the rate per mile. Formerly, per diem or trip rates were the rule, but the mileage basis (advocated by the employees' organizations) is now general, except in switching service, where the rate per hour remains.

During the latter part of 1907, with traffic unprecedented in volume and the railroads not only taxed to the utmost capacity of their facilities but also unable to obtain experienced men, the organizations planned to demand an advanced wage scale with the beginning of the new year (1908). But before negotiations were fairly begun, the effect of the financial depression of 1908 was apparent, and the employees saw the futility of adhering to their program. Instead, their strength was successfully directed toward overcoming the efforts of some of the railroads to reduce wages. The Boston & Maine, for instance, asked its men to accept a 5 per cent cut for a few months.

The men were not unwilling thus to help the company through the crisis, but their leaders would not permit them to accept a reduction, even tho temporary, fearing no doubt that the precedent would be followed generally by all the railroads. A proposal to reduce wages on one of the railroads in the south was frustrated by President Roosevelt, who threatened to institute a Federal inquiry if an attempt were made to diminish the compensation of employees. It was evident that continued efforts to reduce wages would result in conflict with employees; it was plain also that if such a conflict occurred, the railroads would have the active opposition of the President. Under the circumstances, wages were not reduced, but forces were cut to the quick, and a large part of the program for construction or improvement of facilities abandoned. From the railroad viewpoint, the one saving feature in the situation was the opportunity to clear the service of some of the undesirable men who had been employed in 1907, when men better fitted for railroad work were not available.

In October, 1909, representatives of the conductors and trainmen of all the roads east of Chicago and north of the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad met in Boston and formed the Eastern Association of General Committees. At this meeting, a standard wage scale, based on the western rates, was adopted. The roads radiating northward, westward, and southward from Chicago have been obliged to pay higher rates than in the east, and the brotherhood officers have been trying for years to bring the eastern roads to the Chicago standard. After the new basis had been duly passed upon and approved individually by the men through the local lodges of the organizations, the managing officers of all the eastern roads, were,

on Monday, January 3, 1910, simultaneously served with a formal demand for the new wage schedule. Answer was requested on or before January 20th, with the suggestion that the railroads facilitate negotiations by dealing jointly with the organization leaders.

There was difference of opinion among the railroad officers as to how the concerted action of the organizations should be met. In the west, a precedent had already been established by the Chicago General Managers' Association in dealing collectively with organization leaders and committees of workmen, and the suggestion was offered that the machinery of the General Managers' Association of New York be utilized in coping with the present emergency. This method would have facilitated settlement and enabled the railroads to show a solid front in meeting demands which were regarded by them as unreasonable. In the light of subsequent events it is now evident that concerted action would have been advantageous to the railroads. But the plan did not have unanimous support. It was decided, eventually, that each road should meet its own employees independently, decline the wage scale as presented and make the best compromise possible. Prominent railroad managers had publicly stated that the high cost of living justified a reasonable increase in wages. In meeting the committees the officials conceded freely that a revision of the wage schedule should be made to meet new conditions. There was no disagreement on the main question; the difference of opinion was as to the *extent* of the increases.

When the managers and the committees met to discuss the proposition it was evident that the committees in themselves had no authority to deviate

from the scale of wages as presented. It was plain that the organizations were determined to fight. The local committeemen stated frankly that under instructions from their grand officers nothing short of the whole schedule could be accepted.

Very little was accomplished in the preliminary skirmish. Both sides stood firm while the organization leaders planned the line of attack. Their first problem, the selection of the road on which to begin operations, was an important one, and at the outset it seemed that the choice would lie between the Pennsylvania, Baltimore & Ohio, Lackawanna, and New York Central. The Pennsylvania had always paid the highest rates, but the employees were not as strongly organized as on other roads and, moreover, this road had been conspicuously successful in preventing labor union encroachment in matters of management. The Lackawanna offered an attractive field on account of its financial strength, the Central was strongly organized. The Baltimore & Ohio had the combination of wage rates nearly as high as the Pennsylvania, and much stronger labor organization. Finally, it was decided that the first test should be made on the Baltimore & Ohio, and early in February the management of that road found arrayed against it the full strength of the Order of Railway Conductors and Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, with the other organizations interested spectators, prepared to claim their share of the spoils.

President Willard of the Baltimore & Ohio had just assumed office, and when affairs reached a critical state he personally conducted the negotiations with the organization leaders. Efforts to compromise were fruitless. A strike vote was taken, and a conflict seemed inevitable. Arbitration was offered but de-

clined by the men. President Willard then suggested mediation, and altho this was not agreeable to the labor leaders they finally concurred in the request of the railroad that Chairman Knapp, of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and Commissioner Neill, of the Bureau of Labor, adjust the differences under authority of the Erdman Act. After a series of hearings, an award was given, which, considering that the Baltimore & Ohio (with one exception) already had the highest rates, was a distinct victory for the men. The following table will show the result in a few typical instances: —

Wage Rate in Cents per Mile [1]

Class of Service	Old Rates	Rates Demanded	New Award	Per Cent Increase
Through Passenger Conductors	2.60	2.75	2.68	3.1%
Through Freight Conductors	3.465	3.80	3.63	4.8%
Through Passenger Brakemen	1 33	1.65	1.50	12.8%
Through Freight Brakemen	2.31	2.53	2 42	4.8%

While the Baltimore & Ohio negotiations were in progress, the relations between the New York, New Haven & Hartford and its trainmen had been strained almost to the breaking point. After protracted conferences and the company's final refusal to grant the rates called for by the Eastern Association schedule, a strike vote was taken and the leaders were empowered to go to any extreme to force the issue. About this time, the Baltimore & Ohio award was handed down and a compromise was effected under which the same basis of rates was applied to the New Haven system. The comparative results, in a few typical cases, are tabulated: —

[1] Passenger crews average 155 miles per working day: freight crews, 100 miles

Wage Rates per Mile or per Day

Class of Service	Old Rates	Rates Demanded	New Basis	Per Cent. Increase
Through pass'r conductor	2.15c.	2 75c	2.68c.	24 7%
Local " "	$3.60	$4.25	$4.20	16.7%
Through freight "	3.35c.	3.80c.	3.63c.	8.3%
Through pass'r brakeman	1 25c.	1 65c.	1.50c.	20.0%
Local " "	$2.20	$2 55	$2.50	13.6%
Through freight "	2.35c.	2.53c.	2.42c.	3.0%

Under the old rates, a conductor running a through passenger train from Boston to New York, on duty from five and one half to six and one half hours, was paid $5.00. Now he receives $6.22, an increase of 25 per cent. His compensation averages $1.00 per hour. The brakemen on the same train formerly were paid $2.90; now they receive $3.48, an increase of 20 per cent. Their compensation averages more than 60 per cent per hour, their work and responsibility are light, and in many cases their experience in railroad service does not cover more than two or three years.

Following closely on the New Haven settlement, negotiations were concluded on the same basis with the Boston & Maine road. This had the same passenger wage rates as the New Haven with lower freight rates. The Boston & Maine freight men, therefore, received a relatively greater increase than that shown in the foregoing comparative table.

While the program of standardization was progressing in New England, the committees on the New York Central were contesting for higher pay. First, they demanded the Eastern Association standard rates, but when the Baltimore & Ohio basis was applied

to the New Haven and Maine systems, the Central committees withdrew the original demands and insisted on the Baltimore schedule. The New York Central held, with good reason, that the rates awarded on the Baltimore & Ohio to meet the physical and traffic conditions obtaining on the mountainous divisions of that road could not fairly be applied to the New York Central — a level, four-track road, fully block signalled, running frequent express passenger and fast freight trains with very few stops. The Baltimore & Ohio mileage rate, made sufficiently high to enable its trainmen to earn fair wages, would give unreasonably high wages on the New York Central, with its more favorable operating conditions. For instance, a passenger conductor, then paid $144 per month, running between New York and Buffalo, 439 miles, making 18 one-way trips per month, would receive $212 per month on the Baltimore basis, an increase of 48 per cent.

In other respects, the Baltimore & Ohio basis was held by the New York Central management to be inapplicable to its conditions, and therefore could not be granted. The situation became tense and strike talk was prevalent. As a result of an individual poll of the members, the leaders announced an overwhelming majority in favor of extreme measures to gain their point.

Meanwhile, the company had offered a compromise wage scale which carried with it substantial increases. This being rejected, President Brown offered to arbitrate, but the organizations refused to jeopardize the advantages already gained on the Baltimore & Ohio, and the other roads which had adopted that basis. They would consider nothing short of that schedule. The railroad, realizing the serious results

of a strike in its effect upon public convenience and sentiment, suggested first that the aid of the Erdman Act be invoked so that the mediation committee might award a new wage basis more applicable to the New York Central. The brotherhood leaders would not join in the request. The company then suggested that the subject be referred to the up-State Public Service Commission. This, too, was declined by the men. As another alternative, the company suggested that the presidents of the Chambers of Commerce of the important cities along the lines of the New York Central be asked to act as an arbitration committee. This, however, with the two previous arbitration plans, was rejected, and, finally, President Brown proposed the selection of a committee consisting of Mr. E. E. Clark, of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and Mr. P. H. Morrissey, President of the American Railroad Employees' and Investors' Association. Mr. Clark, for many years, was Grand Chief Conductor of the Order of Railroad Conductors, a position which he resigned when appointed to the Interstate Commerce Commission. Mr. Morrissey, similarly, had a long experience as a railroad labor leader and for several years prior to the acceptance of his present position, was Grand Master of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. Both were skilled in the principle and practice of wage negotiation, and, since the New York Central had sufficient confidence in their fairness to leave the adjudication of the whole subject to them, the committees could hardly afford to decline the proposal. Mr. Clark and Mr. Morrissey both accepted and no time was lost in entering upon the task.

In the meantime affairs on the Lackawanna Railroad had reached a critical point. The company had

refused absolutely to concede the Baltimore schedule, offering instead a flat increase of 6 per cent. On their part, the men would not recede from their ultimatum: Baltimore rates or a strike. The seriousness of the situation may be judged from the fact that a strike was actually ordered, and the order withdrawn but an hour or two before the time set, when an agreement was reached to accept the results of the New York Central award. A few days later, similar action was taken on the Delaware & Hudson where the committees had been in session with the management unsuccessfully endeavoring to obtain the Baltimore basis.

Hence, in undertaking to arbitrate, Mr. Clark and Mr. Morrissey knew that the scope of their award would include not only the New York Central, but two other railroads, serving different sections (notably the anthracite region) and having widely differing physical and traffic characteristics. It was agreed, however, that the evidence and argument should be confined to conditions on the Central road, and altho the Lackawanna and Delaware & Hudson, were to abide by the terms of the decision for the New York Central, and the Lackwanna was represented at the hearings, they were not permitted to offer evidence nor present arguments on their local conditions.

The agreement defined the scope of arbitration as between the rates of pay then in effect and the rates demanded by the Eastern Association standard. It was a foregone conclusion that the new award would follow closely along the lines of the Baltimore award, and in this neither side was disappointed. The only question in doubt was the number and extent of the exceptions to suit New York Central local conditions. In local passenger, slow freight and yards, the award

was identical with the Baltimore & Ohio, but in through passenger service the company gained an important advantage in the recognition of the fairness of a lower mileage rate on long runs between New York and Buffalo. Instead of the standard rate of 2.68c. per mile, the award called for 2.4c.; and in certain cases it specified that on shorter runs a rate of 2.5c. would obtain until next year, when the standard rate would become effective. A similar concession was made in the fast freight runs. Instead of the standard rate of 3.63c. per mile applying at once, a rate of 3.4c. was made to apply until January 1, 1911. A comparison of the old and new will illustrate the differences:—

Wage Rates per Mile or per Day

Class of Service	Old N.Y C. Rates	Eastern Ass'n Rates	New B &O Rates	New N Y C. Rates	Per Cent Increase over old basis
CONDUCTORS:					
Through Passenger	1 756c	2.75c.	2.68c.[1]	2.40c.	36.7%
Suburban Passenger	$3.58	$4.25	$4.20	$4 20	17.3%
Through Freight	3 00c	3.80c.	3.63c.	3.63c.	21.0c.
Local Freight	3 55c.	4 05c.	3.975c	3.975c	12.0%
Switching, day	$3 30	$3.80	$3.70	$3.70	12.1%
Switching, night	$3 50	$4.00	$3.90	$3.90	11.4%

Under the new basis, to take the illustration already used, a conductor making 18 one-way trips per month between New York and Buffalo, is paid $190, an increase of $46 per month or 32 per cent.

The award was dated May 4th, and the rates were made retroactive to April 1st. In making them effective, the Lackawanna attempted to apply to its through

[1] Applies only to through runs between New York and Buffalo; other through runs of more than 155 miles per day take the B. & O. rate of 2 68c. per mile.

runs the exception provided for the Central in the case of its New York-Buffalo crews, and thereby renewed the hostility of the organizations. They refused to permit the exception on the Lackawanna, and on appeal to the arbitration board they were sustained. A passenger conductor running between Hoboken and Binghamton, 206 miles, now receives $5.62 for the trip of five and one half to six and one half hours; formerly he was paid $4.02. The increase per day amounts to $1.50 or 37.2 per cent.

A few days after the publication of the New York Central award, its terms were adopted substantially in effecting settlements between the managements and employees of the New York Central Lines west of Buffalo, including the Lake Shore, Michigan Central, and Big Four.

Thus the wage basis set by the mediators under the Erdman Act for the Baltimore & Ohio established a new high level which was at once adopted *in toto* by the two principal railroads of New England (now under one management). It has been shown also that the attempt of the Central, by further arbitration, to get away from the Baltimore award, was successful only in one important respect; and that, under the guise of a new award, the Baltimore schedule was forced upon the Lackawanna and Delaware & Hudson, and finally upon the Central System Lines west of Buffalo.

There remained two important roads in eastern territory on which settlements had not been effected,— the Pennsylvania and the Erie. The latter made an earnest appeal for immunity from the high wage rates, pleading financial inability to pay them. But the insistent cry for standardization would not be stilled by statistics showing the company's indigence. An

exception for the Erie would have made a troublesome precedent for the labor leaders and the road was unsuccessful in its plea for a favorable differential. The leaders of the organizations did agree, however, as a concession, to advance the date on which the standard rates should become effective, and thus permit the Erie to pay somewhat lower rates until September, 1911.

On the Pennsylvania Railroad, the differences assumed a serious aspect. In some respects, working conditions had been more favorable than on neighboring lines, and it had so long been the policy of the road to pay the highest rates in its territory, that the employees came to regard this distinction as a right rather than a favor. Therefore, at the outset, the men were frank in expressing their expectation that the advantage so long enjoyed would be continued. In other words, the Pennsylvania was expected to pay higher rates than the Baltimore & Ohio and the other roads which had adopted its basis. It is doubtful whether the employees individually were in sympathy with their leaders in their attitude on this particular point. They did vote individually to support their organization officers if a strike was considered advisable, but before such an extreme measure became necessary, an agreement was reached under which the New York Central award would apply, except where Pennsylvania rates were then higher, in which case the existing rates would not be reduced. The settlement of this difficulty practically completed the work of standardization in the eastern territory.

Having thus traced the history of the standardization movement, attention will now be directed to some of its influences. Its underlying principle is to insure that a workman on one dividion will receive as much

for his skill and services as any other workman performing similar service, whether it be in the same locality, or on another division or road. The trend of standardization is always upward, never downward, the low level men being lifted to the higher plane. The weakness of the recent movement lies in the fact that its scope included only the *rates* of pay. No account was taken of differences in physical and traffic conditions and little regard for differences in localities. The rate per mile is the same, whether it be made on a single track, mountainous branch line or on a level, four-track road, where it is possible to run 100 miles in very much less time that on a single track. Again, the rate per day in suburban or short-run passenger service is the same whether the man makes several round trips which keep him on duty most of the time, or when very small mileage is made and the man is off duty the greater part of the time. For example, the train crews on the short branch lines have always been paid less than the men in main line suburban service. Branch line service is not so exacting; there is less responsibility, particularly on short branches with but one engine and crew. The hours are more regular and usually there are long lay-over periods between trips in which the crew is not required to do any work. It is possible, in most cases, for the men to take all their meals at home and to live a regular home life, particularly when employed near localities where rents and other living expenses are low. These advantages have been sufficient to make branch runs attractive, even at lower wages. On one of the roads a branch line conductor, prior to the recent changes was paid $3.25 per day; a conductor on the main line in suburban service was paid $3.84. The arbitration award has placed them on a parity and both receive

$4.20 per day. The main line man, performing more work and harder work for his $4.20 than the man on the branch, is paid the same sum.

Another instance of inequality is in the relation between road freight rates and yard switching rates. A freight train brakeman receives $2.42 for 100 miles or less if made in 10 hours or less. His runs are usually so arranged that he makes a trip out of his home terminal one day and returns the next day, thus necessitating his taking rest at the opposite terminal, where he must rent a room or otherwise arrange for a resting place and meals, with the consequent expense. In slow freight service there is no regularity to his hours — the crews are in a "belt" and are run "first in, first out" according to the demands of the service. He is therefore unable to have regular home life or to make social engagements. In contrast with these working conditions, the yard brakeman or switchman has regular hours. If he lives near the yard he can have all his meals at home, has no road expenses, can sustain normal home life and work under conditions which are more attractive than road freight work. Yet he receives $3.40 for 10 hours of day service, and $3.60 for the same number of hours at night, an average of $1.08 more per day than the road brakeman. To be sure, the work of the switchman is hard and dangerous; a large proportion of injuries to employees occurs in yard service. But road freight work is also hazardous, particularly on mountain grades where the brakemen must ride out on top of the train. The difference in risk and work in yard service, whatever it may be, is nearly offset by work which entails less responsibility and regularity of hours which permits a more normal home life. Undoubtedly yard brakemen should get slightly higher wages, but an

increase of 45 per cent over the road rate is hardly reasonable.

A freight conductor is paid $3.63 for 100 miles or 10 hours. A freight brakeman's rate is $2.42, or 67 per cent of the conductor's rate. In yard service, the day conductor is paid $3.70 and the day brakeman $3.40 or 92 per cent of the conductor's wages. The brakeman in yard service is paid 45 per cent more than the same man in road service; the yard conductor has only 4.7 per cent more than the freight conductor. The road brakeman receives only 67 per cent of the conductor's rate; in yard service the brakeman's pay is 92 per cent of the conductor's wage. The differences in work and hazard require some distinction in pay but none so great. Again: The pay of a yard engineer on one of the New England roads before the recent increases was $3.84 per day; the night yard brakeman's was paid $2.50, or 65 per cent of the engineer's rate. Now the engineer is paid $4.11 and the night yard brakeman $3.60 or 88 per cent of the engineer's wages. The discrimination lies in the fact that the engineer's pay was increased but 7 per cent, while the brakeman, through the process of "standardization," was awarded an increase of 44 per cent.

There has heretofore been some equality between the rates paid to the firemen and brakemen in yard service. Now the yard brakeman receives $1.25 per day more than the fireman. The negotiations between the companies and the engineers and firemen were completed or were well under way before the Baltimore & Ohio award was handed down and was forced upon the other roads. Consequently, the disturbance of ratios of long standing has caused some disaffection on the part of the engine crews, who acted independently and were not a part of the standardization

program. They have no fault to find with their own rates of pay, but feel that the conductors and trainmen are receiving more than their fair share of the wage increases.

The question may be raised as to how the men themselves regard the inequalities between road and yard service. A satisfactory reason for their apparent indifference does not suggest itself unless it is that the greater fascination of train service makes up for the smaller wages. The romantic features of life on the road appeal particularly to the "green" men, and if they elect road service when they begin, they must stay in road service if they would retain their seniority rights. Probably, too, the younger men do not appreciate as fully as the experienced and married men, the advantages of regular hours and home life.

It has already been noted that an actual discrimination between men of the same class results from the abolition of the different mileage rates for divisions of different physical and traffic characteristics. The Baltimore & Ohio award of 3.63c. for conductors and 2.42c. for brakemen has been applied uniformly in freight service by all railroads in the eastern territory, where formerly the rate was scaled to meet local conditions and insure reasonable wages. A typical case on the Lackawanna system will illustrate the point. When first the mileage basis for paying train crews was adopted, the Buffalo division freight men, operating over a practically level road, were paid a slightly lower rate per mile than the freight men on the Scranton division, which abounded in grades and curves. By reason of physical advantages, the Buffalo division men made their mileage in less time, made it easier, and earned more money per month

than the Scranton division crews, notwithstanding the higher mileage rate on the mountainous division. The new basis has now levelled this distinction between the two divisions, to the disadvantage of the Scranton division. The Buffalo men will make no complaint but the Scranton men will surely feel aggrieved because of the loss of the premium of long standing. A Buffalo conductor now earns from 70 to 80 cents per hour; the Scranton division conductor, from 52 to 60 cents.

Enough has been said to prove that standardization of the rate per mile has not only not eliminated discrimination but has actually created new inequalities. The cases mentioned are sufficient to indicate their nature and seriousness.

We shall now consider briefly the effect which the arbitration proceedings and the extensive wage increases have had and may yet have on the relations between the railroad companies and the employees in train service.

With the beginning of the year 1910, railroad managers were confronted with the problem of raising freight rates as well as with the necessity of paying higher wages. If the situation had not been complicated by the freight rate question, it is probable that the railroads would have offered a more determined resistance to the demands of the employees and might have prevented some of the unreasonably high wage rates which are causing such a heavy increase in operating expenses. But when the negotiations reached a point where it plainly meant arbitration or strike, the railroads chose the more peaceful alternative. A strike, undoubtedly, would have added to the popular distrust of railroads and placed greater difficulties in the way of a satisfactory adjustment of the freight

rate situation. Possibly, too, the personnel of the arbitration boards may have suggested that if Federal instrumentality were responsible for materially increasing the cost of railroad operation by awarding higher wages, then Federal approval might not be withheld when the rate increases came up for review. The Baltimore & Ohio award was framed by Chairman Knapp of the Interstate Commerce Commission and Commissioner Neill of the Bureau of Labor; on the New York Central arbitration board, the senior member was Commissioner Clark of the Interstate Commerce Commission. It remains to be seen how much weight will be given by the Commission to the relation of railroad wages to freight rates but there is an impression in railroad circles that since the awards in the wage disputes have, in a sense, the stamp of governmental approval, it would be inconsistent on one hand to force upon the railroads a wage scale higher than they could afford to give voluntarily and on the other hand deny the railroads the one ready means of meeting the increased expense.

Confirming this impression, the committeemen representing the employees frequently expressed the opinion, while arbitration was in progress, that the increase in the pay roll expense would be more than made up by the greater revenue from the advanced freight rates. From the frequency and apparent sincerity of the statement, the conclusion is natural that it was inspired by the grand officers of the organizations. If this opinion is correct, then they too felt that there would be no hitch in the freight rate program. But the injunction restraining the western roads from increasing their rates, the subsequent agreement between President Taft and the railroads under which the tariffs were withdrawn, and the pas-

sage of the amended Interstate Commerce law, have made it impossible, as yet, for the railroads to recoup themselves in the manner intended. The disappointment of the railroads on account of the setback to the plan for advancing the rates has had the effect of aligning the railroads workers on the side of the companies in deprecating the policy of the administration and the Interstate Commerce Commission. As an illustration of the force of this sentiment, the organizations arranged a mass meeting in New York, September 24th, which was attended by upwards of 3000 railroad men, and in which resolutions were adopted pledging their

> "collective and individual efforts against those who are selfishly and otherwise antagonistic to the interests from which we derive our livelihood" and "earnestly requesting the Interstate Commerce Commission to consider the proposed increases in the transportation rates of our employers in a broad-minded manner, and from the standpoint of their general knowledge of railway conditions as they exist; that technicalities and impractical theories should not be allowed to over-ride well known facts; and that such disposition may be made of the matter as will foster and encourage the efficiency of the service, the welfare of the rank and file and maintenance of standards best calculated to enhance the development of the properties."

The Interstate Commerce Commission, Congressmen, and Senators have been deluged with petitions from railroad employees praying that the railroads be given some relief from further regulation and restriction and allowed to advance their freight rates. The railroad brotherhoods, as such, rarely permit themselves to be drawn into any action which has a political aspect; but in the effort to induce the Interstate Commerce Commission to give favorable consideration to the freight rate increases, the brotherhoods and their individual members have been active allies of their employers. This alliance is justified by the organiza-

tion leaders on two grounds; first, because the prosperity of railroad workers depends primarily on the prosperity of the railroads and the further prosperity of the railroads demands a greater revenue per unit of service rendered; and, second, since generous wage increases were granted either by arbitration proceedings or voluntarily, and on the assumption that it would be possible to advance freight rates at once, the organizations, to show good faith, should do all in their power to influence the Interstate Commerce Commission to act favorably.

Looking at the situation from another viewpoint, the normal gap between the railroad management and their men has been widened by the results of recent arbitration. Heretofore, except in a few cases, the renewal of wage agreements has been a matter of adjustment between the managements and local committees representing the men, in which mutual concessions were common. The greater proportion of the settlements were effected without recourse on the part of employees to the grand officers of their brotherhoods. Only in rare cases has it been necessary to invoke the aid of outside influence or to submit the differences to arbitration. It is too much to hope that this policy of local adjustment will be the rule hereafter. The success of the standardization movement, engineered entirely by the national leaders of the organization, undoubtedly marks the passing of the local committee as a power in settling wage rates. It is reasonable to prophesy that nearly all future negotiations of this character will be conducted by the grand officers of the brotherhoods or their deputies. The outlook in this respect naturally is distasteful to the railroad official, who resents outside interference, and who conscientiously feels that the best

interests of the road and its men lie in handling such matters locally between the company and its men as employees, not as labor unions. On some of the eastern roads, it had never been necessary to call in a union official. But in the light of precedents established this year, and the success of the organizations, railroads managers are facing changed conditions which are forcing the personal element in the relations with employees to the background.

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